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I Pre-colonial Days
Available evidence suggests that the
Indonesian ruling class, in particular of
Java, knew how to take care of its well-
being vis-a.-vis the potential competition
of the "bourgeoisie" rather better than its
feudal counterparts in Europe. To begin,
the rulers themselves took up trading.l)
They also deliberately excluded other
social classes from this activity. Historians
continually quote one Javanese prince's
remark that
.. .if the natives had more than the
necessaries of life, they would use the
surplus [gained from trading] to do
some harm to their rulers [Day 1904:
l23fn. 2].
It was to prevent the nse of the in-
digenous bourgeoisie that Indonesia's
trading aristocrats in general preferred to
use the overseas Chinese. This was
because the latter were manipulable; due
mainly to their almost total lack of "clout."
Unlike the other two equally long esta-
blished foreign groups (the Arabs and
Indians), the Chinese had nothing in the
way of ideology or religion whereby they
could proselytize the indigenous ruling
* Indonesian Research Scholar, Bradford Univer-
sity, Yorkshire, England
1) V., La., Van Leur [1967: 66 et Jlassim].
circles. As a result, in Indonesia the
Chinese never became associated with the
representatives of state power but in the
business realm. As they in effect existed
outside the protection of the local institu-
tionalized customs and obligations, the
Chinese had always been "marginal" in
all other respects; hence, suitable to be
made use of and discarded at will with
little chance of causing repercussions
dangerous to the interests of the ruling
class. It was because of these reasons
that in pre-colonial Indonesia many key
posts, such as that of the shahbandar
(harbour master), were traditionally
farmed out to the Chinese. 2)
But even in the sole realm of trading,
there was no question of the Chinese
acquInng any influence beyond that
tolerated by the local rulers. To preempt
the Chinese from becoming economically
powerful, the traditional Chinese contain-
ment methods included the custom that
when a Chinese died all his worldly
possessions went to his local (i.e., in-
digenous) sire. Hence, although some
Chinese occupied apparently high posts,
Yet the fact that the Chinese were
afraid that upon their death their goods
2) V., La., De Haan [1912: iii/436], Glamann
[1958: 75], Meilink-Roelofsz [1962: 286],
Schrieke [1966: i/28], v. also, for markets,
Moertono [1968: 90].
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would revert to the king shows how
Insecure their social position was
[Meilink-Roelofsz 1962: 247].
If this for any reason proved insufficient,
the ruling class would resort to the more
direct use of force. In the 1620s, when
the Chinese traders of Banten-forced
by the Dutch-were moving their business
to the emergent Dutch trading centre
Batavia, the Bantenese ruler not only
confiscated the properties of the Chinese
but also enforced capital punishment
against their owners. One Sim Suan,
said in most sources to be extremely rich
and therefore "influential," was simply
and unceremoniously
...taken prisoner by the authorities in
Bantam and put in irons. His house,
in which the United Company (VOC)
was storing a large parcel of goods, was
seized, and his wife and children were
also deprived of their liberty. To be
sure, he was released again after a
couple of months, but from that time on
his position was very precarious [ibid.:
251].
Anakoda Wating, a trader in rice and
proprietor of arak distilling enterprises
(who became a witness at the signing of
the 1614 contract between the VOC
and the ruler ofJ akatra) fared even worse.
For trading with the Dutch he was ex-
ecuted by the Bantenese ruler. 3) That
all this in the event failed to prevent the
exodus of the Chinese to Batavia is, of
course, another matter altogether.
It is to be noted, however, that In
3) V., La., De Jonge [1869: ivj270], Hoetink
[191 7: 348].
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common with other pre-capitalist societies,
in Indonesia at the time there was no
conscious or concerted effort to keep the
Chinese alienated. Resident Chinese
were free to adopt the Indonesian cultural
attributes of or marry into the local in-
digenous society and, thus, became "Indo-
nesian." And once they did this the
former-Chinese were treated by the local
rulers no differently from the latter's
indigenous subjects. In other words, the
Chinese were made use of in the ways as
outlined only as long as they preferred to
be so treated (by maintaining their
"Chinese" attributes and ways that dis-
tinguished them from the indigenes) .
Which explains the widespread absorption
of the Chinese by the indigenous society,
that took place at the highest stratum of
the local (indigenous) society as well as
the lowest. Amongst the former, Puteri
Ong Tien of the Court of Ceribon (West
Java) and Raden Patah, founder-ruler of
Java's first Muslim kingdom Demak
[Campbell 1915: i/77-78; De Graaf &
Pigeaud 1974: 37, 139; Penanggung
1972: 19, 26, 28; Raffles 1830: iijl25,
127; Tempo 1977: 30], are two cases in
point.
II Colonial Spice Trading Era
The comprador tradition of the Chinese
in the Indonesian economy suited the
Dutch well. Precisely because they were
not part of the local (rural) institutions,
the Chinese were highly mobile as well as
vulnerable: a quality most suitable for
compradorship in a society whose most
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dominant economic sector (VaC) was
promoting monopoly. As the nature of
trading in this period (due to the fact that
its most important commodity, spices,
grew "wild") was accumulative/distrib-
utive, only the comprador type of service
was in demand. All this explains why
Dutch policy makers virtually outdid
each other in praising the "diligence,"
"law-abidingness" and other laudable
qualities of the Chinese. Similarly
making a virtue out of necessity, the most
famous Governor General (GG) of this
period (Jan Coen) is continually quoted
as having proclaimed that there were no
other people on earth better than the
Chinese and that there were never enough
of them for the Dutch colony.
The Dutch strategy, in meeting the
demand for Chinese labour, was two-
faced. In areas where the Chinese position
was established, the basic strategy from the
early days of the vac was to buy into the
Chinese network.4) So deceptive was
this strategy that, e.g., in relation to sugar
manufacturing, even scholars of today are
duped into accepting at face value the
colonial claim that the Chinese "domi-
nated" this industry until the 19th century.
A more careful look reveals that the
Dutch method of advancing capital to
Chinese manufacturers made complete
nonsense of this claim. I t is to be noted,
to begin with, that before the demand for
sugar was created by the Dutch the
amount produced by the resident Chinese
4) V., La., Colenbrander [1919: il/243], Mei-
link-Roelofsz [1962: 250, 251,259], Coolhaas
[1953: 966].
was so small that when the vac after-
wards purchased sugar on a regular basis
it at first had to buy from other countries.5 )
Then, for quite some time, whatever was
subsequently available from Indonesia
had to be supplemented by what was
bought from China, Siam, Taiwan and
other places. 6 ) It was only owing to the
capital injected by the Dutch that the
production of Java sugar eventually be-
came commercially significant. 7)
As a commercial undertaking sugar from
the 1700s was well on its way to becoming
a decidedly Dutch preserve. It was a
"putting out" industry wherein the
Dutch supplied the capital and land
whereas the role of the Chinese was limited
to supplying the labour. It goes without
saying that even in this limited role some
Chinese managed to invest themselves.
It goes equally without saying that their
position (as client-capitalist) was definitely
subservient to that of the Dutch financiers;
who, in addition to controlling the capital
in quantities that mattered, had the sole
exercise over the most effective tools of
coercion. This situation was reflected,
e.g., by the fact that the industry was only
commercially significant in areas under
the direct rule of the vac. This was
why, until 1740, the industry was con-
centrated particularly in Batavia's en-
virons8); although West Java's soil as a
whole was the least suitable for sugar
5) V., La., Tio [1923: 5], Gimbrere [1928: 10,
11].
6) V. also Geerligs [1911: 118].
7) V. also Levert [1934: 55].




In this arrangement, arrogating the
double function of gamekeeper and
poacher,lO) the Dutch were able to fleece
the Chinese in multifarious ways. E.g.,
the vac
...maintained a monopoly of the sugar
trade that enabled it any time to break
the prices it paid to the producers [Day
1904: 70].
This accounts for the great disparity be-
tween the price the vac paid the Chinese
producers and the selling price; in c. 1710
they were 1 1/6 stuiver and 13 a 14 stuivers
respectively.!l) Before being able to
produce their sugar, the Chinese of course
must rent the land. Here too they were
evidently preyed upon not only by the
corporate vac but also by its individual
servants.!2) In 1752, e.g., GG Mossel
sublet the land he rented from an indige-
nous ruler at 100 Rds/year to a Chinese
sugar producer for 1,000 Rds/year.!3) It
was undoubtedly via machinations such
as this that Mossel became "the biggest
sugar manufacturer of his time" [De
Haan 1912: iv/548]. Finally, the
Chinese could only sell their sugar to, or
through, the Dutch14); the Dutch alone
decided the price. l5)
In places where the Chinese position
9) V. also Tio [1923: 2].
10) After Boxer [1979: 76].
11) V., La., De lange [1875: viijCXXX], Mols-
bergen [1939: 43-44], Tio [1923: 10].
12) V. also Burger [1975: ij56].
13) V. De Haan [1912: iiij785].
14) V. also Burger [1975: ij57].
15) V. also Tio [1923: 10], Gimbrere [1928: 12].
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had not taken root, the Dutch simply
bludgeoned in; using the Chinese merely
as their "semi servile"l6) labourers.
This was the case in Batavia, which the
Dutch built on the ruins of Jakatra after
they razed it in 1619. Here, in acquiring
their Chinese, the Dutch used all means
fair and foul. GG Coen is on record as
having forced visiting Chinese to settle
in Batavia,l7) and sending ships on
kidnap missions to the southern coasts of
China and many other Southeast Asian
emporia for able-bodied Chinese. IS)
Apart from kidnapping abroad, the Dutch
also preyed upon the Chinese who had
resided in other parts of Java itself. 19)
Although in establishment literature
this question is virtually ignored, Batavia's
great demand for Chinese subsequently
occasioned a brisk trade In Chinese
slaves. 20) This was known as, i.a., the
"hog trade."2l)
16) After Ogg [1977: 81].
17) V., i.a., De lange [1869: ijCXV], Colen-
brander [1919: ij475; 1920: iij566; 1921:
iiij517], De Haan [1922: ij74-75], Vleming
[1926: 4], Cator [1936: 10], Ong [1943: 58],
Meilink-Roelofsz [1962: 254].
18) V., La., Coen's letters of 6 Sept. 1622 & 20
Jun. 1623 in De Jonge [1869: ij262-263,
280], Hoetink [1917: 351], Colenbrander
[1919: ij726, 768, 794; 1921: iiijl57, 306;
1923: vj494; 1934: vij271, 295,302,311,328],
De Haan [1922: ij76], Van Dam [1931: ii(l)j
684, 684fn. 4], Vermeulen [1938: 7-9],
Coolhaas [1952: 783-784], Van Klaveren
[1953: 44], Purcell [1966 :297].
19) V., La., MacLeod [1927: ij237], De Graaf
[1958: 39], Vermeulen [1938: 6-7], Coolhaas
[1952: 659], Meilink-Roelofsz [1962: 291].
20) V., i.a., Botenkoe [1929: 112-113], Chen
[1967: 161].
21) V. Chen [1967: 161].
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III 18th Century Colonial
Econolllic Shift
As the 18th century dawned, the decline
in the spice trade accelerated. This was
caused by a combination of factors, in-
cluding the saturation of the European
market because too many Europeans were
involved in this trade, and an actual drop
in the demand for spices.
On the first count, acute cOmpetItIOn
between various European powers meant
that "Profits from the spice trade dropped,
squeezed by ... increasing costs of defend-
ing monopolistic control against rival
nations" [Magdoff 1978: 102J.22) On
the second, the drop in dellland was
brought about, i.a., by the discovery of
cattle's "winter fodder," which rendered
obsolete the use ofspices to season meat. 23)
As a commodity, spices were increasingly
being replaced by the "three new drinks,
stimulants and tonics: coffee:, tea and
chocolate" [Braudel 1977: 178J. By
1720-30 tea consumption in Western
Europe became "considerable" [ibid.:
180].
The 18th century saw the phenomenal
growth of the tea and coffee trades,
these stimulants becoming (eco-
nomicallyJ more important ...while the
relative value of pepper, and spIces
declined still further [Boxer 1973 :
223] .24)
Technological advances that were
22) V. also Ogg [1977: 81].
23) V. also Caldwell [1977: 62].
24) V. also Glamann [1958: 13, 14-15, 183],
Furnivall [1944: esp. 42].
changing the pattern of European trade,
too, made themselves felt in Indonesia by
way of a change in the requirement for
raw materials. In Java this shift was
reflected in the willingness of the Dutch
to pay more for tobacco, cotton yarns and
indigo. 25) Another feature of this great
economic change is shown by the fact that
the Dutch turned the most fertile region
of West Java into a huge plantation(Pri-
angan); the better to meet the world de-
mand for these cash crops.
The Chinese Became Redundant
Many of the crops now in demand were
however not native to Indonesia. And
crop transplantation entailed new socio-
economic conditions which only indig-
enous labour and resources could sustain.
Coffee is one case in point. At every
harvest, its transport alone required hun-
dreds, even thousands, of draught ani-
mals26 ) and the use and construction of
an evidently complex systems ofcanals and
rivers in West Java.27 )
In the case of native/established prod-
ucts, such as cotton and indigo, the
method of their production had to be
altered drastically to make their yields
remunerative. The changes in produc-
tion, in turn, required the massive re-
cruitment of a rural labour force; which,
again, could only be supplied by the
indigenous sector of the populace. As the
colonial archivist De Haan, with specific
25) V. Realia [1882: ij222; 1885: iifl, 134].
26) V., La., Raffles [1830: ijI42], De Haan [1910:
ij165; 1912: iiij644].
27) V. esp. De Haan [1912: iiij649ff].
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regard to cotton, puts it:
.. .indeed, only by winning the trust
of the (indigenous) Regents can as
many cotton yarns as possible be
obtained... [De Haan 1910: ij90].
All this necessitated the existence of a
settled and readily available rural labour
reserve.28) And for this the Dutch
needed the collaboration of the indigenous
(agrarian) ruling c1ass.29) The need
for the indigenous Indonesians' collabo-
ration became crucial particularly as the
vac, consistent with its monopoly poli-
cies, came to rely on forced deliveries.30)
One important reason for this was because
only people bound by customs and obliga-
tions resulting from landed stakes could
be coerced to cultivate little known crops
and forced to deliver the products at
prices fixed by the buyer (i.e., the Dutch).
As one Dutch "Commissar" for Native
Affairs put it late in the 18th century:
... no native could be made to cultivate
coffee, unless he possesses a significant
number of rice fields... [ibid.: ij371;
1912: ivj463].
I t is obvious that, for the same reasons
that had made them mobile as com-
pradors, the Chinese could scarcely be
pinned down here. In the altered
economy of colonial Indonesia, the
Chinese had become the wrong type of
labourers. The requirement for a dif-
ferent type oflabour meant that from then
28) V. also De Haan [1910: ijI16].
29) V. also De Haan [1910: iJ99].
30) For the latter, v., i.a., De Jonge [1870: vj
CXXXIV], Levert [1934: esp. 54], Mols-
bergen [1939: 44].
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onwards the Dutch had no structural
need for the Chinese. This situation was
epitomized by the fact that when the
VOC decided to cultivate coffee in Java,
young plants were distributed to indige-
nous rulers31 ); not to Chinese contractors
as presumably the case would have been
earlier. Likewise, it was an indigenous
ruler (of Ceribon)-and not a Chinese-
who in 1706 was made supervisor of the
coffee plantations in Priangan.32) In
indigo, too, the Dutch now made use of
the indigenous regents' services.33) In
his letter of 25 November 1708, GG
Van Hoorn mentioned that the cultivation
of indigo in Batavia's hinterlands, such as
Krawang, was put under the "reign" of
the Javans.34)
In cotton production, the story was the
same. One of the first Dutchmen to
realize the importance of cotton in Java
(Tack) advised in a letter of 30 November
1685 for the use ofJavans in the cultivation
and spinning of cotton in Batavia's en-
virons.35 ) In 1693, in response to the
spiralling demand in Europe, Batavia
sent a committee-comprising two former
followers of Banten's Pangeran Purbaya
and two Dutch militarymen-to urge
West java's regents from Cianjur to
Nusakambangan to deliver all available
cotton to Batavia. The reason for the
31) V., i.a., De lange [1870: vJCXXXVI], De
Haan [1910: i/119; 1912: iii/494], Molsbergen
[1939: 45], Glamann [1958: 207].
32) V., i.a., Van der Chijs [1886: iii/566], De
Haan [1910: i/IOI, 220].
33) V., i.a., De Haan [1910: iJ91; 1912: iiiJ391-
393], Realia [1885: ii/I].
34) V. Dejonge [1870: vJI54].
35) V. De Haan [1912: iiiJ384].
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inclusion of the two indigenous dignitaries
was for "tact" and because "only by
winning the trust of the Regents" could
the products in demand be obtained.36)
This committee was followed by numerous
others. As a rule, the composition of
their membership was "half white, half
brown" [De Haan 1910: i/91]. We can
say with Van Klaveren, although he was
then referring to coffee:
Only the moral authority of the [indig-
enous) regents, could induce the pop-
ulation to start work [Van Klaveren
1953: 60].
Indeed, even for 200 bundles (i.e., as
opposed to large deliveries on a regular
basis) of cooking tamarind the Dutch now
went to the indigenous princ:es37); and
not to the supposedly "indispensable"
Chinese middlemen.
Special Ban on Chinese in Priangan
The nature ofthe whole altered economy
was epitomized by the Dutch concept of
the huge plantation of Priangan. In
this region no foreigners, especially
Chinese,38) were allowed to settle. It is
true that from time to time, certain other
non-local indigenes (such as the Central
and East Javanese, Balinese, ]\;[akasarese,
etc.) were also not allowed to settle there.
But this was temporary; a response to the
disturbances which prevailed in the area
at the time.39) By contrast, the exclusion
of Chinese from the region was a per-
36) V. De Haan [1910: i/90].
37) V. Realia [1882: i/263].
38) V., La., Raffles [1830: i/315], De Haan [1910:
i/l04, 105,390; 1912: iii/436; 1912: iv/550].
39) V. De Haan [1912: iv/548].
manent feature of the colonial economIC
policy.
That the ban was aimed specifically
against Chinese is also highlighted by the
VOC resolution of 18 August 1693 which
mentioned the banishment of a number of
Chinese to the Cape for their "temerity"
to enter the region.40) Numerous other
laws, such as the 1711 and 1715 resolutions
of the dyke-reeves (Heemraden) of Batavia's
environs, repeatedly reiterated the ban-
ning of Chinese from Priangan. 41 )
It was only in isolated cases where the
service of the Chinese was understood by
the Dutch to be indispensable that excep-
tions were made. In places experiencing
labour scarcity, such as Ciasem and
Pemanukan (whose labourers were
absorbed by the lumbering business),
"a strict exclusion of the enterprising
Chinese was [therefore) impossible" [De
Haan 1910: i/352]. A degree of leniency
over the ban was also exercised with regard
to sugar, again "because people were
entirely dependent on the Chinese for the
sugar industry," and because it was
impossible to prevent the geographical
spread of the location of sugar mills con-
comitant to the irreversible diminution
of wooded areas (for the mills' fuel)
around Batavia proper.42)
Another seeming exemption to the
general rule of excluding the Chinese
from Priangan was probably that for the
cultivation of pepper. Here, too, the
reason was necessity. Batavia, at least
40) V. De Haan [1912: iii/436].
41) V. De Haan [1912: ivJ545].
42) V. De Haan [1910: i/389, 392; 1912: iv/545].
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until the liquidation, had nobody else
but the Chinese to help it meet its pepper
demands. Pepper, being labour inten-
sive,43) could not be cultivated as a sideline
to the staple rice (like the other cash crops).
This accounts for the particular reluctance
of the indigenes to take up this crop.
The Dutch's shabby record in arbitrarily
lowering prices with regard to coffee,44)
moreover, did not help matters.45) Only
the Chinese could fill this vacuum.
Nonetheless, even when they had to be
tolerated for exceptional reasons as
outlined, these Chinese were monitored
closely by the Dutch. For this purpose
the Chinese were subjected to a pass
system which, however, only allowed
them movement in strictly limited areas.46)
It was true that non-local indigenes too
had to have passes to be allowed to settle
in the region. However, consistent with
the altered politicoeconomics, passes for
them were issued free of charge. 47 )
That the exclusion of Chinese from
Priangan was to be maintained with
singularity can be gauged from the fact
that even in the case of the traditionally
Chinese speciality, sericulture, Batavia
completely circumvented the Chinese.
Thus, in GG Zwaardecroon's reign (1718-
25), the Dutch cajoled the reluctant Javans
to take up this activity48); when they
could easily have used the Chinese.
43) V. also Rosengarten [1973: 343].
44) V. also De Haan [1910: i/ I23ff] , Furnivall
[1944: esp. 40].
45) V. also De Haan [1910: i/227].
46) V. De Haan [1910: i/390; 1912: iv/546].
47) V. De Haan [1912: iv/557].
48) V. De Haan [1910: i/esp. 239].
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In sum, from about I 700 onwards
the Chinese became not only useless to
the emerging economy of the Dutch
colony, but also inconveniently in the way
of both the major parties now playing the
leading roles49); an object of enmity of
the indigenous privileged class (which
now became the Dutch main comprador
group) whose traditional place in the
intermediary trade the Chinese, during
the previous economic era, helped to
undermine, and a source of acute em-
barrassment to their former Dutch masters.
All this, incidentally, was highlighted by
the fact that whilst in the era of the spice
trade the GGs befriended Chinese towkays
(the friendship of Coen and Kapitan So
Bing Kong is well-known,)50) in the new
economic era one famous case was GG
Zwaardecroon's patronage of the Regent
of Cianjur51) (the much-cited coffee
supplier of the VOC).
More Economic Reasons for a Chinese
Liquidation
To begin, a sizeable acreage of culti-
vated land(which could be used to cultivate
the newly adopted crops) was in Chinese
hands. This was of course the making
of the Dutch themselves who, in their
former economIC policies, made the
Chinese cultivate wild areas (particularly
those surrounding Batavia). Initially
this was to offset the VOC's dependence
on the supply of rice from Mataram,52)
49) V. also De Haan [1910: i/338].
50) V., La., Hoetink [1917: 365; 1923: 19], De
]onge [1870: v/122], Vermeulen [1938: 14].
51) V., i.a., De Haan [1910: i/168; 1912: iv/376].
52) V. also De Haan [1922: i/130].
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and subsequently (especially in case of
the sugar industry and its subsidiaries)
for their revenues.53) These Chinese
lands became indispensable to the Dutch
because of two basic reasons.
One, they were under the direct rule
of the VOC; facilitating supervision and
control over the cultivation of the newly
adopted crops. Speaking on pepper, De
Haan says:
... pepper cultivation ... shall be started
in the ... lands which are under
Batavia's jurisdiction, its proximity (to
Batavia) is considered (good) to ensure
a realiable "regular delivery of the
product" more than in the regency of
(e.g.) Ceribon, and the Natives are less
able to exercise their aversion toward
this crop (than they would have been in
further away places] so that only "reg-
ular supervision" (as opposed to coer-
cive, and more costly, measures] ·lS
needed ... [De Haan 1912: iiij847].
In addition, the immediate reasons of
security prevented the Dutch from operat-
ing too far afield.54 ) Two, these were
lands brought to a cultivable stage from
a wilderness. In the wild stage, when
lands were simply appropriated by the
Dutch55 ) and leased out to Chinese
farmers, they "legally" belonged to nobody
(the so-called "waste" lands). To
"repossess" these lands was obviously
far easier and much simpler for the Dutch
to undertake than expropriating those
53) V. also De Haan [1922: i/130].
54) V. also, with regard to sugar, Burger [1975:
i/56].
55) V. also De Haan [1922: i/130, 426].
belonging to indigenous socioeconomic
groups with their deep-rooted customs and
institutionalized obligations. Above all,
the latter would have incurred the wrath
of Banten in the west and Ceribon in the
east (not to mention the powerful
Mataram) ; at a time when the Dutch had
not felt strong enough to tackle any of
them.
The need to confiscate the Chinese-
farmed lands became crucial as the
plantation system eventually becan1.e the
pivot whereon colonial extraction was
based. Looking at it with specific regard
to coffee, De Haan states:
It (the Government) would not allow
the Java coffee to fall into private trade,
(because] that created harmful com-
petition; everything must be in its
(government's] hands and therefore its
cultivation in other regions, (such as)
Bantam or Mataram, was not tolerated
[De Haan 1910: ij122].
In other words, only the lands under
their direct rule (which had virtually all
been farmed out to Chinese) were origi-
nally suitable for the adopted crops such
as coffee. And, indeed,
The first experiments with the coffee
plants had been undertaken in small
gardens in the surroundings ofBatavia...
[ibid.: ij150].
Beside coffee, groundnut, cocoa, tea,
tobacco and many others were all initially
planted in Batavia's proper environs. 56)
All this created such a demand for land
that, with regard to sericulture, even
56) V., i.a., De Haan [1910: i/230].
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Chinese graveyards were expropriated
by the Dutch for the growing of mulberry
trees. 57 )
Also, now that sugar was fast becoming
one most important cashcrop, the Dutch
understandably wanted to have progres-
sively greater control in this field. In the
international market, the need for such
control became increasingly urgent as
(due to the growing competition of sugar
from Barbados, Brazil and the Caribbean)
the VOC had increasing difficulties in
regulating its price. 58) At the same time,
in Indonesia's internal economy, sugar was
important for the purchase (and control)
of the indigenous labour now indispens-
able for the economy. It created jobs
at various stages of its production and one
of its by-products, arak, "was vital for
Batavia's trade with the interior" [Gong-
gnJp 1928: 74].59)
A further determinant necessitating the
assumption of a significantly greater role
in sugar production by the Dutch was
their realization that, to stay competitive,
sugar must be cultivated in a plantation
system. And this realization probably
struck the Dutch with added force by the
18th century as Java's sugar faced in-
creasingly acute competition mentioned
above. In other sugar producing areas,
because of the use of slave labour and the
proximity of these places to Holland,60)
prices could be kept very low. By con-
57) V. De Haan [1910: ij240; 1912: iiij894].
58) For price fluctuations in Europe, v., i.a.,
Glamann [1958: esp. 162-164].
59) V. also Furnivall [1944: 41].
60) V., La., Gimbrere [1928: 28].
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trast, in Java up to 1740 the VOC acquired
its sugar by advancing capital to Chinese
contractors61); on whom the Dutch could
hardly exercise a complete control. It
seems clear that the increasing demand for
the cake could only be met by confiscating
the whole bakery.
It so happened that the labour re-
quirement for the sugar industry could be
fully met under the seasonal labour system.
Within this requirement the indigenous
labourers, unlike the Chinese, could be
"allowed" to return to their villages to
tend their rice (thus sparing the Dutch
from the need to provide for them) between
planting and harvesting/milling times.
This was brazenly spelled out by the
famous colonial sugar experts as follows:
Java as contrasted with most other cane
growing colonies is in the favourite
(sic] position of disposing of a sufficient
supply of good and cheap labourers.
The greatest advantage moreover is
that these people are entirely free, that
they are available when they are wanted
and that they need neither be paid nor
provided for during the time when
there is no work to be done [Geerligs
and Geerligs 1937].
However, in the sugar manufacture the
termination of the Chinese role was far
from being simple. One reason for this
was because the Dutch money-lenders
had sunk too much capital into the
industry as it was. They were naturally
reluctant to make any changes that might
harm their immediate interests. There
61) V., i.a., De Haan [1910: ij263].
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was presumably a conflict of interests
between these Dutch financiers and those
who-either because they had not been
committed to the industry as it was or
because their ken encompassed broader
perspectives-were promoting the longer-
term economic policy which essentially
demanded that the remaining Chinese
be squeezed out. The "massacre" of the
Chinese, of course, settled this conflict.
Another difficulty besetting the Dutch
which needed nothing less than a drastic
measure to solve was the threat against
the vac's monopoly as posed by the
Chinese client-capitalists. Excluded from
participating in the altered economy,
the unused capital of these Chinese
became a sort of "floating capital";
rearing to jump at the slightest opportu-
nity. The "frustrated" Chinese capitalists,
so to speak, posed a corporate threat to the
new monopoly economy. And it was
undoubtedly because of these left out
capitalists that the Dutch effi::>rt to mo-
nopolize coffee encountered difficulties. 62}
So much so that De Haan exclaimed:
In the Chinese we have inborn[!]
blacklegs [De Haan 1922: ii/35].
To prevent the Chinese froml "smuggl-
ing," therefore,
Henceforth the Chinese...who had no
passes ran into the grave danger of
being arrested and put in chains.... In
1723 the transactions in coffee were
made punishable and the crop was
placed under the Company's monop-
oly....Since 1730 (in order to maintain
62) V., La., De Haan [1910: ijI21-122; 1912:
iiij499-500] .
the aforesaid] the Chinese needed to
have a pass to be tolerated beyond the
outer posts.... [De Haan 1910: ij104,
122, 290].
Similarly, it was In order to safeguard
the monopoly of coffee and against the
"fears that the Chinese will buy up this
article" [ibid.: i/390] that the Priangan
region, as outlined, was declared off-limit
to Chinese. Although economic exigen-
cies often necessitated the temporary
exemptions to the monopoly rule, it is
notable that
... for the Chinese the closure (of
Priangan] was hermetic ... (the Dutch]
held fast to the rule that there the
Chinese could not be tolerated [ibid.:
i/392] .
Apparently, the pressure to curtail
drastically (if not ban completely) the
Chinese participation in all important
sectors of the economy was such that the
Chinese evidently felt hemmed in; even in
sugar industry. This can be gauged
from the fact that since the 1650s an
increasing number of Chinese capitalists
opened new mills in areas under the
official suzerainty of indigenous rulers
such as Banten, Ceribon and the littoral
of Central and East Java. 63)
It was undoubtedly to cover this
loophole that in 1677 Batavia made an
agreement with the Susuhunan of Mataram
wherein it was stipulated that all the sugar
produced in his jurisdiction should be
63) V., La., De lange [1870: vjCXXIX; 1877:
vijXVI], Veth [1898: ii/134], Molsbergen
[1939: 43].
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sold only to the vac.64) But the result
must have been disappointing for the
Dutch complained that the Chinese, in
league with the local indigenes (if not the
Susuhunan) , sold their sugar to buyers
other than the niggardly vac.65)
Last but by no means least, in keeping
with their volteface, the Dutch increasingly
resented the fact that the Chinese
occupied the "best parts" of Batavia.
It is remarkable that the circulation of
such resentment overlapped, time-wise,
with the 18th century economic shift.
When the influential chronicler-preacher
Valentijn voiced his resentment in the
mid-1720s,66) he was only voicing a senti-
ment which was fast becoming popular
among Batavia's Europeans. His con-
tention that the Chinese therefore posed
a threat to the security of the Dutch was
quoted and requoted and later used to
justify the subsequent liquidation of the
Chinese.67)
IV The Need to Liquidate
the Chinese
The change in the nature of colonial
acquisition with the coming of the 18th
century created a situation wherein the
Chinese became expendable not only
politically but also economically. In the
monopoly economy being promoted by
the Dutch there was no place for com-
64) V., La., De longe [1870: v/CXXIX], Mols-
bergen [1939: 43].
65) V. also Molsbergen [1939: 43].
66) V. Valentijn [1726: iv(I)/250].
67) V., i.a., Van Hoevell [1840a: 462fn. 1].
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paratively free traders such as the Chinese.
Like the Bandanese in 1620, now the
Chinese too had to be exterminated. It
was to achieve and maintain monopoly in
the spice trade that the Bandanese were
exterminated68); and it was for the same
purpose (if involving different products)
that the Chinese in 1740 had to be
liquidated.
The evidence suggests that the liquida-
tion of the Chinese was executed in two
stages. Firstly, the Dutch taxed them to
ruination. The basic capitation tax
imposed on the Chinese, comprising the
"head" and "hair" taxes, is a case in
point. Rising and falling according to
the economic exigencies, from the last
quarter of the 17th century the head tax
was payable by the Chinese at approx.
one Rd per head per month.69) The fine
for the failure of payment was on average
20Rds.70) The VOC edict of 21-29
May 1690 ordered that Chinese must
wear the Chinese coiffure, with the
penalty of six months in the chains (i.e.,
hard labour) fornon-compliance. 71 ) This
law was renewed in 1701. 72) Having, by
these statutes, forced the Chinese to wear
nothing else but "Chinese hairstyle,"
the Dutch then taxed them for this
"privilege." On average, at least from
1710 the monthly hair tax was one Rd. 73)
68) V. also Levert [1934: 53], Hanna [1978:
46ff].
69) V. Van der Chijs [1885: i/437; 1887: iii/171;
1887: iv/30].
70) V., La., De longe [1869: iv/236], Van der
Chijs [1885: i/76].
71) V. Van der Chijs [1887: iii{264].
72) V. Van der Chijs [1887: iiif517].
73) V., La., Rogers in Harris [1744: 179].
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one Rd was worth between 48 and 60
stuivers. 74 )
Even if we settle with the lower
estimate, the compound head and hair
taxes still meant that a Chinese had to pay
over-three stuivers each day, for his head
and hair alone; until he died (when his
next of kin was to pay for his buria175) in a
graveyard already paid for by the Chinese
community76», or left the colony al-
together (for which he had to pay even
bigger "mulct," viz., 30 guilders or approx.
720 stuivers77 ». In actual tenns, for the
privilege of keeping his head and hair a
Chinese had to produce, ever:.y day, the
equivalent of approx. three chickens78) or
over-4 2/3lbs rice. 79 ) Such amount of
chicken (given the little meat intake typical
of rice-eaters) would have meant a daily
feast for a family of 10 to 14, while the
rice could have lasted a man for four to six
days. In comparison, De Haan (who was
describing the condition of prison food
for the indigenes in 1772) remarks in a
footnote that
The usual ration of rice for the troops
etc. is 40 lbs per month ... [De Haan
1912: iv/695fn. 1].
That is to say, the defenders of the Dutch
state power were living on less than 1/4
the amount of rice the Chinese had to
74) V., La., Van der Chijs [1885: if537], Realia
[1886: iii/144, 235], Campbell [1915: iif768].
75) v., La., De Haan [1922: if504-505].
76) v., i.a., Realia [1882: i/122, 277, 279].
77) V., La., Crawfurd [1856: 97], Verhandeling
der Munten, Maaten en Gewichten [1786:
411], Van der Chijs [1885: ij437], Realia
[1886: iii/144, 235].
78) V. Batavia [1782: i/19].
79) V. Beschryving [1741: 10].
produce to keep that part of the body
which among other mortals naturally
comes free of charge with the rest of their
torso.
To be able to earn the money for these
basic taxes, the Chinese were made to pay
further for a profusion of passes. These
included the pass to keep a warung (stall).
Priced initially at two Rds per month,80)
the warung permit was officially sold at
six Rds per month by 1739. 81 ) The penalty
for non-payment was 20Rds. 82) Other
impositions on the Chinese included the
fee for getting married, enforced from
c. 1706.83) As if these were not crippling
enough, the Dutch subjected the Chinese
to further impediments.
In 1727, the nomad habit of a section
of the Chinese (i.e., the itinerant prac-
tice of Chinese pedlarsJ was forbidden,
and even further residence in Java was
denied to many who had been settled
there for a long time. Thereupon the
keeping of warongs, i.e. little shops, was
no longer allowed in the interior, and
the means of communication with the
towns were impeded [De Klerck
1938: i/364].
Unless we are to take it that the Dutch
policy makers to a man were peculiarly
bereft of common sense, it seems that the
aim of these obviously extortionate ex-
actions was to reduce drastically, if not
destroy completely, the Chinese role in
the colony's economy. At the same time,
80) V., La., Va1entijn [1726: iv( 1)/246], Realia
[1882: i/178, 277, 280; 1886: iv/368].
81) V., La., Van der Chijs [1887: iv/470].
82) V. Van der Chijs [1887: iv/470].
83) V. Realia [1882: i/500].
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the result of these extortions eventually
tipped the balance favourably for the
proponents of the long-term policies
of the Dutch ruling class vis-a.-vis the
short-sighted money-lenders as outlined.
The resulting bankcruptcies meant that
fewer and fewer of the Chinese debtors
could meet their obligations toward their
Dutch creditors. As they consequently
became liabilities to even the Dutch
financiers, the Chinese were irreversibly
manoeuvred into a corner from which
there was only one alternative to being
annihilated without resistance: annihi-
lated for attempting to defend themselves.
That in either case the Dutch had all
the reasons to be confident of prevailing
is obvious from their overwhelming supe-
riority (politically and economically as
well as militarily) over the hopelessly
disparate (economically and regionally)
and unarmed Chinese ofJava.84)
Still, the Dutch would have been
cheated if the victims were allowed to
assimilate freely with the indigenous
population. It was to preempt the "dis-
appearance" of the Chinese in this way
that the Dutch implemented segregative
laws. The vac resolution of 18 July
1713, e.g., attributed Chinese who so
84) The volume of evidence that the writer has
been able to gather-described in his forth-
coming book, The 1740 Massacre of the Chinese
in Batavia --convinces him that there
could hardly be any question on the Dutch
foreknowledge of their overwhelming politico-
economic and military superiority over the
Chinese who opted to defend themselves
("revolted"); let alone those who abode the
Dutch and remained inside the walls of
Batavia.
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disappeared to commIttIng "disorderly
conduct" punishable by imprisonment. 85)
The 26 January 1717 resolution decreed
that no Chinese was permitted to marry
outside his community and that the vac
arrogated the powers to nullify exogamous
unions. 86) The 11 November 1721 reso-
lution decreed that the correspondence
of Chinese with the indigenous sovereigns
was forbidden under the penalty of the
chains.87)
For similar purposes, the Dutch in
their treaties with various indigenous
potentates as a rule insisted on claiming
suzerainty over the Chinese residents of
the officially autonomous states. E.g.,
in the 1677 treaty with Mataram, the
Dutch stipulated that Mataram's Chinese
subjects must be placed under the juris-
diction and "discipline" of the vac.88)
The Dutch also made agreements on
extradition of Chinese who tried to
disappear into Mataram's realm; the
vac resolution of 3 February 1711 89 )
attests to this. In the contract with
Banten of 21 August 1731 the vac
likewise stipulated that the Bantenese
should not interfere, "directly or In-
directly," with the head tax of the
Chinese.90)
The Massacre of the Chinese
I t is beyond the scope of this article
85) V., La., Realia [1882: ij279].
86) V. Realia [1882: ij279, 500, 502; 1886: iiij65].
87) V. Realia [1882: i(279; 1885: ii/16].
88) V., La., Meinsma [1872: ij96], also Cator
[1936: 16].
89) V. Realia [1885: ii/53].
90) V. Stapel [1938: v(96)jl14].
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to describe fully the second (physical)
stage of the Chinese liquidation. Suffice
it to say that the Dutch orchestrated this
liquidation first by confining the Chinese
inside the walls of Batavia, stripping
them of the smallest kitchen knife and
putting them under a dusk-to-dawn
curfew.91) The Dutch then armed what
they themselves called "the low-class
masses" [Meinsma 1872: iJ132] and gave
them (in establishment literature became
known collectively as the "mobs")
a free hand to plunder and massacre the
helpless Chinese. 92) The rapine inside
Batavia was allowed to go on from the
9th to 22nd October 1740.
While the "mobs" were despatching
Chinese lives within Batavia, VOC troops
liquidated those who had fled from the
city before the curfew and roamed in
Batavia's environs (on the accusation
that these were "revolting").
At the end of the "Grand Guignol,"
as most sources agree, 10,000 city-Chinese
lost their lives. Little is said about the
many more who must have perished
outside the city's walls (of the 80,000-odd
Chinese prior to the liquidation,93) only
around 3,000 survived).94) Even less is
mentioned in the existing literature of
the yet far greater number who must
have had what remained of their bargain-
91) V., i.a., Chronologische [1840: 61], also
Raffles [1830: ii/234-235], Van Hoevell
[1840a: 478], Hoetink [1918: 459 fn.3],
Vermeulen [1938: 64].
92) V. also, La., De Jonge [1877: ix/LXIX],
Hollander [1882: 27], De Haan [1922: i/500].
93) V., i.a., De Klerck [1938: i/363].
94) V., La., Vleming [1926: 6], Cator [1936: 18].
ing power vis-a.-vis their corporate (Dutch)
exploiters eroded still further.
I t is notable that the Dutch then
declared an open season against Chinese
all over Java. GG Va1ckenier mentioned
that in June 1741 the Indies Council
voted for a "general massacre of the
Chinese over the whole of Java."95)
So, over six months after what as a rule
was vended as an "accident" in Batavia,
a rerun of the same "accident" took
place in Semarang (Central Java).96)
Likewise,
In other parts of Java the violence
continued...where i.a. the Chinese of
Soerabaia and Grisee (East Java]
were also massacred [Liem 1952 :
30J.
V Sotne Direct Results of
the Liquidation
It has generally been alleged (by well
meaning if unquestioning scholars as
well as outright apologists) that the
massacre was an "accident" or an "excess"
of the Dutch reaction to an alleged
Chinese "revolt." The remarkable fit
between the Dutch interests and the
liquidation of the Chinese factor from the
economy (not to mention that similar
"accidents" were repeated all over Java)
is too close for coincidence. We have
seen the politicoeconomic factors which
preceded (i.e., created the situation for)
95) V. Letter 6 Nov. 1741 [1877b: 376], also
Javasche Oorlogen [1830: 96], Raffles [1830:
i/83; ii/236], Realia [1882: i/289].
96) V. Letter 6 Nov. 1741 [1877b: 378], Colen-
brander [1925: 193], Vermeulen [1938: 89].
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the liquidation. We will now see some
examples of the gains which became avail-
able to the Dutch as a direct result of this
liquidation.
As mentioned, the 1700 economic
shift necessitated the Dutch to confine
the Chinese in towns. Political and
economic motives were at play here.
By flushing them out of their rural niches,
the Dutch made the Chinese position
even more precarious (and, thus, their
bargaining power even weaker) . For-
bidden to invest in real estate, the Chinese
had to invest in liquid assets such as cash
and jewellery and (about the only form
offixed property allowed them) houses.97)
One of Batavia's richest Chinese, head
of the community "Kapitan" Ni Hoekong,
is said to have
.. .lived in a very large house (filled]
with expensive household contents and
in which he had stored a considerable
amount of cash [Hoetink 1918: 448].
Even those who were seemingly engaged
in agriculture were actually "urban-
orientated," if not urban-based. Because
they were implanted artificially in the
colony, they were essentially "displaced"
people. Having no social or political
"roots" in the Dutch-ruled locality, the
Chinese (in contrast to the indigenous
peasantry) had no base on which they
could fall back in times of crisis.
Two things characterize urban-based
wealth. One, it is more conspicuous
than the landed wealth. As the best
place to keep one's liquid wealth was
97) For the latter, v. also Ong [1943: l47fn. 3].
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(in the days when housebreaking inci-
dents happened far more frequently than
today) to carry it with oneself, a China-
man rarely disappointed robbers, thieves
and bullies of all kinds. Despite being
repeatedly robbed, most Chinese in the
Dutch colony had no other access to
livelihood but to continue their peri-
patetic peddling or hawking practices.
A robber did not bother to think that
the retail goods and cash "float" of a
Chinese he had robbed twice or thrice
before were most probably lent to the
latter on credit. What interested him,
and others engaged in similar pursuits,
was the fact that every time a Chinese
was shaken hard enough, coins and other
forms of wealth would invariably fall
out of his pockets. This must have been
one of the reasons for our belief that all
Chinese were "rich," as immortalized in
the Javanese ditty: "Gina, krincing-krincing
ana" (roughly: "Chinaman, chink-chink
(sound of coins] he's always loaded").
Two, the wealth of the Chinese was
therefore more "perishable" than the
landed wealth. Whilst even the poorest
rural labourer (if only because the
greater part of his wages was in kind)
was cushioned, e.g., from the effects of
inflation, the Chinese were fully exposed
to its ravages. In a pogrom such as of
the 1740, the entire saving of an urban
dweller with hardly any political leverage
like the Chinese presumably perished in
every sense of the word. Hence, as a
result of the 1740 anti-Chinese campaign,
most Chinese had no other choice but
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simply to abandon their possessions,
notably their lands. 98) Consequently,
after the 1740 liquidation, there was an
abundance of "fallow" land in Batavia's
enVIrons. As Krom puts it, there was
"plenty of free land" [Krom 1941 : 92].
The resolution of 7 June 1751 also spoke
of stretches of land in the region of Bogor
"lying fallow," as the former tillers had
either fled or died during the 1740
liquidation. 99) All this, of course, created
a favourable condition for Dutch incur-
SIOns into formerly Chinese-tenanted
areas.
Settlement of European Colonists
The Dutch did not need much else
than simply to "repossess" the lands thus
"vacated" by the Chinese. All this
facilitated the transfer of the formerly
Chinese-tenanted land; either to the
European burgher-farmers that the post-
1740 regime in Batavia was again keen
on importing from Europe for its colo-
nization project or, in line with the
altered economy, to favoured indigenous
rulers. Hence,
... agriculture, which was exclusively
undertaken by the Chinese up to the
time they revolted (i.e., got liquidated]
thereafter passed into European hands
[De Klerck 1938: i/377] ,100)
Families of European farmers are known
to have been planted in Bogor, Ciampea,
Cipanas, Cisarua, Depok, Gadok, Jam-
98) V. also Chronologische [1840: 55, 56].
99) V. De Haan [1912: iii/146].
100) V. also De Haan [1910: ifPersonalia 42].
bang, Krawang, Tangerang, etc.l01) As
for the distribution of this largesse to
the indigenes,
R Cesolution of the GG and members
of the Indies Council]. 17 Jan. 1741
appoints a Wangsawidjaja, Lieutenant
of the Javanese, for the ownership,
with whatever mortgage that applies
thereupon, of a land ... used to belong
to the Chinese Litsiangko ... [De Haan
1911: ii/479 fn. 2].
This was why many indigenous partners
of the altered economy, such as this
Wangsawidjaja, became coffee suppliers
to the vac only after the liquidation of
the Chinese.I02)
No less remarkable IS the evidence
that, after the Chinese liquidation, there
seemed to be an outburst of European
propertied citizens leaving Batavia
to live in the more salubrious "up
country."103) Again, the Chinese liquida-
tion in effect prepared the environs to
accommodate more favourably these non-
Chinese Batavian colonists.
Coffee
The liquidation of Chinese tenant-
farmers in Batavia's environs also solved
the various problems that the vac was
having with regard to coffee.
Due to the recurrent glut In the
European market, the Dutch in Indonesia
had been having repeated problems with
-------- ----
101) V. Van Deventer [n.d.: ii/141-142], De
Haan [1910: i/266ff, 274; 1912: iv/95, 99ff],
Krom [1941: 120].
102) V. also De Haan [1911: ii/478].
103) V., La., Stavorinus [1798: iiif402-403].
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coffee. As the saying went at the time,
the plantations in the Batavia and Ceribon
regions alone surpassed the demand of
the whole Europe.104) On top of this
must be added the substantial amount of
coffee produced in Mauritius, the West
Indies, etc.,105) which had a strong
lobby in Holland.l06 ) Batavia had re-
peatedly to resort to drastic measures,
such as (in 1726) halving the purchasing
price.l°7) In 1733 the VOC forced
Mataram's Susuhunan to pledge on the
"total extirpation" of coffee plantations
in his domain.l08) In 1735 coffee plants
were rooted out in many places under
the VOC's jurisdiction.109)
Despite all this, the position of the
VOC with regard to coffee was by 1738
quite desperate. Its "coffer was empty,
its credit exhausted, and its warehouses
were chock-full" with unsaleable coffee.l10)
So much so that, as the resolution of
30 October 1738 shows, Batavia had
to borrow 4.8 million guidens.l ll ) This
continuing problem came partly from the
fact that the vac had no complete
monopoly of coffee production. The
Chinese planters in 1738, e.g., produced
over half a million kilogrammes of coffee,
nearly 29% of the total production of
Priangan.112)
104) V., La., De Haan [1912: iii/51O].
105) V. also De Haan [1912: iii/511].
106) V. also Wright [1961: 4].
107) V. De Haan [1910: i/l24].
108) V. Dejonge [1877: ix/XXII, 237], De Haan
[1912: iii/539].
109) V. De Haan [1910: i/124, 127; 1912: iii/504,
511, 607].
110) V. De Haan [1910: i/128; 1912: iii/51O].
111) V. De Haan [1912: iii/512].
112) V. De Haan [1912: iii/513].
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It was only after the 1740 "massacre,"
in which many Chinese coffee planters/
financiers perished, that the Dutch prob-
lem of over-production--or, at least,
the part originating from the Chinese
sector which contributed toward the
overall overproduction--was solved.1l3)
Sugar
By the same default on the part of the
Chinese, a substantial portion of the
sugar industry and its subsidiaries (part.
the distilling and trading of arak) also pas-
sed from Chinese to European hands.l14)
Most (sugarJ mills changed hands and
became the property of Europeans...
[Van Klaveren 1953: 51].
This explains the fact that it was only
in 1750 (i.e., after the Chinese liquidation)
that the VOC's monopoly over sugar
became a reality.l15)
As Lauts somewhat flippantly puts
it, the "good that came out from the
bad" (i.e., the advantage (for the Dutch]
of the liquidation) was the entailing shift
of ownership from the Chinese to the
Europeans.116)
There were undoubtedly cases of ex-
propriation which were less tangible.
Take the case of the Dutch method of
expropriation by means of capital pene-
tration in the sugar industry. The follow-
ing example of Van Riemsdijk (Commis-
113) V. also De Haan [1910: i/l29; 1911: ii/477,
478-479; 1912: iii/517-518].
114) V., i.a., Van Deventer [n.d.: ii/103, 143-144],
Veth [1898: ii/13], De Haan [1922: i/519],
Vermeulen [1938: esp. 111].
115) V. also Van Klaveren [1953: 56].
116) V. Lauts [1857: iii/41].
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sar of Native Affairs: 1776--84), mutatis
mutandis, illustrates the multifarious ways
whereby the Dutch ensured the sub-
servience of the Chinese "partners":
... he [Van Riemsdijk] was a big sugar
manufacturer, or ... rather, he owned
sugar mills, which he hired out to the
Chinese. The resolutions of 5 and 19
Aug. 1800 elucidate the meaning of
this: the Chinese manufacturers worked
with the capital provided [by the
Dutch] or the anticipated delivery
of sugar; however the [Dutch] money-
lenders practiced usury to such an
extent that the whole industry was
threatened with disaster. And [in all
this] the greatest usurer was v.R. [van
Riemsdijk] who, as it appears from the
R[esolutionsJ. 27 June and 5 Aug.
1800, had a claim over a certain
Chinese [the sum of] 140,734Rds [De
Haan 1910: ijPersonalia 70].
Property inside Batavia
Similar benefits were also accrued
by the Dutch directly from the abandoned
properties of the Chinese which were
found inside the walled city of Batavia.
A day before the liquidation was
officially ended, the Council of the
Indies in its session of 21 October decided
that the destroyed estates formerly owned
or leased by the Chinese were to be se-
questered or compulsorily purchased.117 )
The VOC edict of 13 December 1740
in effect legitimized the European burgh-
ers who, during the rapine, staked
117) V., La., De Haan [1922: i/494].
their claims over Chinese properties as
the new lawful owners of the properties
so seized. l1S) All this was, of course,
in perfect harmony with the ruling ide-
ology of colonialism; the basis of which
was none other than property grabbing.
In 1740 the requisitioning of Chinese
properties served both the mercenary
and military purposes. On the first
count, properties formerly belonging to
Chinese were put on the mortgage market
for sale.119) In this way the Dutch
ridded the Chinese from their properties
without actually having to decree any
special law or revoking contracts they
themselves made (these properties had
been either mortgaged, sold or farmed out
to the Chinese by the state). With their
Chinese tenants dead or incapacitated,
it was sarcastic of the Dutch to have
professed to "buy up" the former Chinese
properties at, as De Haan [1922: ij362]
puts it, "dirt cheap" prices.
With regard to the military benefit
which not fortuitously accrued from the
liquidation, two VOC advisors on II
November 1740 recommended that the
clearing created by the depredations
(part. in the south of the city and in areas
immediately outside the southern walls)
be preserved so as to give an unobstructed
view from the gun emplacements and
... a better aim and manoeuvrability
of the cannon [Vermeulen 1938 :
112, 113] .120 )
118) V. Van der Chijs [1887: iv/517-518].
119) V., i.a., Official Letter [1877a: 310], Van
der Chijs [1887: iv/521], Vermeulen [1938:
120].
120) V. also De Jonge r1877: ix/LXX].
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Ghettoization of the Chinese
To ensure that the Chinese would never
again resemble a politicoeconomic signifi.-
cance of anything like what they nearly
became in the previous economic era,
the Dutch from 1740 onwards placed the
Chinese in the ghetto; the ultimate in
containment policy forms next to physical
liquidation.
In Batavia, this ghetto was sited in
a place which was well within the range
of the city's gunnery. As the VOC
edict of 5 March 1741 described it, if
need be the Chinese ghetto could be
razed to the ground in no time by the
surrounding bulwarks.121) From ghet-
toes like this all over Java the Chinese
emerged at dawn and to them they must
return at dusk.l 22) Non-compliance to
this permanent curfew entailed the pain
of heavy forfeitures.
The Chinese were then besieged with
layer upon layer of other forms of barriers.
These included their close and continuous
monitoring. The resolutions of 14 and
19 September 1742 ordered that all Chi-
nese must register their names, addresses,
occupations, etc.l23) Those who failed
to register within four days after the an-
nouncement of the laws, as the 9 October
1741 edict stated, were subject to death
penalty.l24)
121) V. Van der Chijs [1887: ivj522], also De
Haan [1922: ij494-495].
122) V. also, La., Vandenbosch [1942: 24].
123) V., La., Realia [1882: ij280], Van der Chijs
[1887: ivj577].
124) V. Van der Chijs [1887: ivj579-580].
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As a further barrier, the Chinese were
forced to carry passes125) or, rather, the
imposition to carry passes (applied to
them prior to the liquidation) was
systematized and expanded. The reso-
lutions of 14 and 19 September 1742
mentioned above imply the issuance of
passes for those who had been vetted.
These Chinese, including those who had
become Muslim and "Parnacken" (half-
breed), could enter Batavia only with
further passes.l26) However, as the 14
December 1742 edict made clear, these
passes did not exempt them from being
flogged in public, branded and put in
chains for hard labour for 25 years should
they overstay the curfew.l 27) To earn
the money for these passes, the Chinese
still had to buy yet another multiplicity
of passes. These included the pass to
use a stall in the market inside Batavia,
which cost 3 1/4Rds128) per week.
I t was part of this containment policy
that the Chinese were kept alienated.
To prevent the integration of the Chinese
into the indigenous community, e.g.,
the Dutch ordered per 22 October 1742
edict that the Chinese who claimed to
have become Muslim and placed them-
selves under the sovereignty of indigenous
vassal-rulers during the 1740 liquidation
be inspected by vac "surgeons" whether
or not they had actually been circum-
125) V. Realia [1882: ij306].
126) V., La., Van der Chijs [1887: ivj534], also
Realia [1882: i/289].
127) V. Van der Chijs [1887: ivj586-587], Realia
[1882: ij280, 289].
128) V., La., Realia [1882: i/280].
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cised.129) On 21 December 1745 Batavia
decreed the resolution stating:
By this notice the mixing (=social
intercourse] between the Chinese and
the Mohammedans are (declared] for·
bidden [Realia 1882: i/281, 468].
The 11 December 1759 resolution classi·
fied half-breeds as "full-blooded"
Chinese.130) This had the dual purpose
of maintaining the segregation policy
and ensuring that, as the "full-blooded"
Chinese, the Peranakans too could be
taxed. In 1766 the Dutch reiterated
the ban on intermarriage between Chinese
and indigenes, first promulgated In
1717,131) and their arrogation to nullify
such exogamous unions. 132) The 21
December 1745 resolution ordered for
measures to prevent the integration be-
tween Chinese and the Muslim population
in general. I33)
Even when already dead, the Chinese
were segregated and confined in a burial
ground specifically set aside for them.
Of course, they were made to pay for the
"privilege" of having their exclusive
graveyards.134) Meanwhile, the 25 Au·
gust 1755 resolution stipulated that for
every dead Chinese returned to China
an official tax of 50 to 100Rds must be
paid. I35) This necrophagous tax was
restated by the VOC resolution of
1771.136) In short, the Dutch saw to
129) V. Van der Chijs [1887: iv/580].
130) V. Realia [1882: i/282; 1885: ii/30].
131) V. Realia [1882: i/279, 500, 502; 1886: iii/65].
132) V. Realia [1882: i/283].
133) V. Realia [1882: i/468].
134) V., i.a., Realia [1882: i/122, 277, 279].
135) V. Realia [1882: i/282].
136) V. Realia [1882: i/123, 283].
it that the Chinese parted with their
money; no matter where their departed
was buried.
VI General Conclusions
There seems little doubt that within
the plantation economy from the l700s
onwards the Chinese were intended to
function as no other than the colony's
corporate scapegoat-cum-bogeyman. Be-
hind the Chinese "screen" the Dutch
hid their own (far more substantial) role
in the exploitation of the Indonesian
people; by parading the Chinese bogey-
man (and posing as the "protector" of
the indigenes137»), the Dutch justified
their presence in Indonesia.
For their dual role of scapegoat-bogey-
man the Chinese had to be kept alienated
from the rest of the population; for only
when thus alienated did they remain
manipulable. And only when manipu-
lable in this way could the Chinese
labour reserve be used by the Dutch as
a "threat factor" in the latter's dealings
with the indigenous labour force. By
1740 the Dutch ruling elite evidently felt
not only that the Chinese had become
expendable but also "unmanageable"
and, therefore, a potential threat. This
was why the Chinese had to be physically
pruned.
That all this was not merely "acciden-
137) Among the latest of a long list of self-ap-
pointed "champions" of "indigenous" in-
terests was GG Fock (1921-25), who in a
booklet published in 1904 fashionably pro-
fessed his distaste for the "Chinese exploi-
tation" of the indigenes [Fock 1904: 3-4].
143
tal" but consequential to (therefore pre-
dictable from) a policy is corroborated
also by the Dutch attitude toward the
Chinese after the liquidation. In con-
trast to their pronouncements to the
contrary (colonial propaganda speaks
of "rapprochement"), the pattern of
the Dutch policy vis-a.-vis the Chinese
from 1740 onwards remained consistently
anti-Chinese. Among the first in the
vac's Chinese containment policies was
the 16 March and 3 August 1742 reso-
lutions which actually set out to limit
the number of Chinese residents by speci-
fying the maximum total in each business
field. Batavia's Board ofAldermen speci-
fied, i.a., for 800 kitchen gardeners, 40
plumbers, 30 cobblers, 30 tailors, 20
barbers, 20 umbrella makers, etc.l 38)
In sum, the Chinese who remained
economically active after 1740 were able
to do so only by default. They existed
marginally on the fringes of the colony's
distributive system. In this light, to
chorus with the colonial propagandists
that the overseas Chinese "controlled
Indonesia's economy" is as nonsensical
as to speak of the tail that wags the dog.
Similarly, to accuse them of being
"privileged" (by the Dutch overlords)




BTLV=Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volken-
kunde
TNI= Tijdschrift voor Neerland's Indie
138) V. Vermeulen [1938: 133-134].
144
VBGKW= Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch
Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen
VKITLV= Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk
Instituut van Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
Batavia, de Hoofdstad van Neerlands Oost-Indien...•
1782-83. Amsterdam-Harlingen. 4 Vols.
Beschryving van Batavia, met des Zelfs Kasteel in
Publyke Gebouwen ...Dagverhaal. 1741. Amster-
dam.
Botenkoe, Willem. 1929. Memorable Descriptions
of the East Indian Voyage 1618-25. London.
(Facs. Reprint)
Boxer, C. R. 1973. The Dutch Seaborne Empire
1600-1800. London.
----. 1979. Jan Compagnie in War and Peace
1602-1799. Hong Kong-Kuala Lumpur-
Singapore.
Braudel, Fernand. 1977. Capitalism and Material
Life 1400-1800. Translated by Miriam
Kochan. London.
Burger, D. H. 1975. Sociologisch-Economische
Geschiedenis van Indonesia. Amsterdam-Leiden-
Wageningen. 2 Vols.
Caldwell, Malcolm. 1977. The Wealth of Some
Nations. London.
Campbell, Donald MacLaine. 1915. Java: Past
and Present. London. 2 Vols.
Cator, W.J. 1936. The Economic Position of the
Chinese in the Netherlands Indies. Oxford.
Chen, Ta. 1967. Chinese Migration, with Specific
Reference to Labour Conditions. Taipei.
Chijs, J. A. van der. 1885-88. Nederlandsch-
Indisch Plakaatboek 1602-1811. Batavia-The
Hague. 17 Vols.
Chronologische Geschiedenis van Batavia, Gesch-
reven door een Chinees. 1840. TNI 3 (2):
1-71. Vertaald door W. H. Medhurst.
Batavia.
Colenbrander, H. T. 1925. Koloniale Geschiedenis.
Vol. ii. 's Gravenhage. 3 Vols.
----. 1919-53. Jan Pietersz. Coen, Bescheiden
omtrent zijn Bedrijf in Indii!. The Hague.
7 Vols. in 8 Pts. (Vol. vii (in 2 Pts.J by W.
Ph. Coolhaas)
Coolhaas, W. Ph. 1952-53. Jan Pietersz. eoen,
Bescheiden omtrent.... Vol. vii (Pt. 1= 1952,
Pt. 2 = 1953). The Hague.
Crawfurd, John. 1856. A Descriptive Dictionary
of the Indian Islands & Adjacent Countries.
London. (Facs. Reprint 1971)
Dam, Pieter van. 1927-54. Beschryvinge van de
Oostindische Compagnie. The Hague. 7 Vols.
A. R. T. KEMASANG: Overseas Chinese in Java and Their Liquidation in 1740
Day, Clive. 1904. The Policy and Administration
of the Dutch in Java. London. (Facs. Reprint
1972)
Deventer, M. L. van. n.d. (1886?) Geschiedenis
der Nederlanders op Java. Haarlem. 2 Vols.
Fock, D. 1904. Beschouwingen en Voorstellen ter
Verbetering van den Economischen Toestand der
Inlandsche Bevolking van Java en A-fadoera. The
Hague.
Furnivall, ]. S. 1944. Netherlands India, a Study
of Plural Economy. Cambridge.
Geerligs, H. C. Prinsen. 1911. Handboek ten
Dienste van de Suikerriet-Cultuur en de Rietsuiker-
Fabricage op Java: de Riet-suikerindustrie in de
Verschillende Landen van Productie. Amsterdam.
Geerligs, P. H.; and Geerligs, R.J. 1937. The
Java Cane Sugar Industry. London.
Gimbrere, E.· G.]. 1928. Eenige Beschouwingen
over de Financiering van de Suikerindustrie en den
Suikerhandel op Java. Tilburg.
Glamann, Kristof. 1958. Dutch-Asiatic Trade
1620-1740. Copenhagen-The Hague.
Gonggrijp, G. 1928. Schets Eener Economische
Geschiedenis van Nederlandsche-Indie. Haarlem.
Graaf, H.J. de. 1958. De Regering van Sultan
Agung, Vorst van Mataram 1612-1645 en die
van zijn voorganger Panembahan Seda-ing-
Krapjak 1602-1613. VKITLV 23: 1-295.
The Hague.
Graaf, H.J. de; and Pigeaud, Th. G. Th. 1974.
De Eerste Moslimse Vorstendommen op Java.
The Hague.
Haan, F. de. 1910-12. Priangan: de Preanger
Regentschappen onder het Nederland~ch Bestuur tot
1811. Batavia. 4 Vols.
----. 1922. Oud Batavia. Batavia. 2 Vols.
Hanna, Willard A. 1978. Indonesian Banda: Colo-
nialism & Its Aj'termath in the Nutmeg Islands.
Philadelphia.
Hoetink, B. 1917. So Bing Kong; het Eerste
Hoofd der Chineezen te Batavia (1619-1639).
BTL V 73: 344-390. The Hague.
----. 1918. Ni Hoekong; Kapitein der
Chineezen te Batavia in 1740. BTLV 74:
447-518. The Hague.
----.1922. ChineescheOfficieren teBatavia
onder de Compagnie. BTLV 76: 1-136.
The Hague.
----. 1923. So Bing Kong; het Eerste
Hoofd... (Eene Nalezing). BTLV 79: 1-44.
The Hague.
Hoevell, W. R. van. 1840a. Batavia in 1740.
TNI 3(1): 447-556. Batavia.
----(with P. Mijer). 1840b. Losse Aantee-
keningen ter Opheldering van de Chronologi-
sche Geschiedenis van Batavia, door een Chi-
nees beschreven. TNI 3(2): 114-145. Bata-
via. (Referred to as "Chronologische")
Hollander, J.]. de. 1882. Handleiding bi} de
Beoe.fening der Land- en Volkenkunde van Neder-
landsch Oost-Indiif. Vol. i. Breda. 2 Vols.
Jonge,J. K.J. de. 1862-85. De Opkomst van Neder-
landsch Gezag over Java. Amsterdam-The
Hague. 13 Vols.
Klaveren, ].J. van. 1953. The Dutch Colonial
System in the East Indies. Rotterdam.
Klerck, E. S. de. 1938. History of the Netherlands
East Indies. Rotterdam. 2 Vols.
Kort Verhaal van de J avasche Oorlogen, welke
met Onderscheidene Prinsen gevoerd zijn,
sedert den ]are 1741, tot den Algemeenen
Vrede Gesloten in den Jare 1757. 1830.
VBGKW 12: 77-254. Batavia. (Referred to as
"Javasche Oorlogen")
Krom, N. ]. 1941 . Gouverneur-Generaal Gustaaf
Willem van Imhoff. Amsterdam.
Lauts, G. 1857. Geschiedenis van de Vestiging,
Uitbreiding, Bloei en Verval van de Magt der
Nederlanders in Indiif. Groningen. 4 Vols.
Leur, J. C. van. 1967. Indonesian Trade and
Society. The Hague.
Levert, Philip. 1934. Inheemsche Arbeid in de Java
Suikerindustrie. Wageningen.
Liem, Twan Djie. 1952. De Distribueerende
Tusschenhandel der Chineezen op Java. The
Hague.
MacLeod, N. 1927. De Oost-Indische Compagnie
als Zeemogenheid in Aziif. Rijswijk (Z. H.).
2 Vols.
Magdoff, Harry. 1978. Imperialism: from the
Colonial Age to the Present. New York-London.
Meilink-Roelofsz, M. A. P. 1962. Asian Trade
and European Influence in the Indonesian
Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630. The
Hague.
Meinsma, J. J. 1872. Geschiedenis van de Neder-
landsche Oost-Indische Bezittingen. Delft. 3
Vols.
Moertono, Soemarsaid. 1968. State and Statecraft
in Old Java: a Study of the Later Mataram
Period; 16th to 18th Century. Ithaca, N. Y.
Molsbergen, E. C. Godee. 1939. De Nederland-
sche Oostindische Compagnie in de Achtiende
Eeuw. In Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indie,
edited by Stapel, Vol. iv. Amsterdam.
Ogg, David. 1977. Europe of the Ancien Regime
145
1715-1783. Glasgow.
Ong, Eng Die. 1943. Chineezen in Nederlandsch-
Indiii; Sociographie van een Indonesische Bevolk-
ingsgroep. Assen.
Penanggung Djawab Sedjarah Tjirebon dan Staf
Keprabonan Lemahwungkuk Tjirebon.
1972. Purwaka 7]aruban Nagari. Jakarta.
Purcell, Victor. 1966. The Chinese in Southeast
Asia. London.
Raffles, Thomas Stamford. 1830. History of Java.
London. 2 Vols.
Realia, Register op de Generale Resolutiiin van het Kasteel
Batavia 1632-1805. 1882-86. Leiden. 3 Vols.
Reis van de Gouverneur-Generaal GustaafWillem
Baron van Imhoff, in en door de]akatrasche
Bovenlanden in 1744. 1863. BTLV 7: 227-
259. Amsterdam.
Rogers, William. 1744. In A Complete Collection
of Voyages and Travels, edited by John Harris.
London.
Rosengarten, Frederick. 1973. The Book of Spices.
New York.
Schrieke, B. 1966. Indonesian Sociological Studies;
Selected Writings. The Hague.
Stapel, F. W. 1907-38. Corpus Diplomaticum
Neerlando-Indicum.... BTLV4-5.
Stavorinus, ]. S. 1798 (Facs. Reprint 1969).
Voyages to the East Indies. Translated by S. H.
Wilcocke. London. 3 Vols.
Tempo. 1977. 7 (41). Jakarta. 10 December 1977.
Tio, Poo Tjiang. 1923. De Suikerhandel van Java.
Amsterdam.
146
Valckenier, Adriaan. De Gouverneur-Generaal
Adriaan Valckenier en de Rade van Indie
aan Bewindhebbers der Gen. Oost-Ind.
Compo (Heeren XVII); Batavia dd. 31
October 1740. In De Jonge 1877, ix: 295-
312. (Referred to as "Official Letter")
De Gouverneur-Generaal Adriaan
Valckenier en de Rade van Iedie aan Bewind-
hebbers der Generale Oost-Indische Compo
(Heeren XVII) (Uitreksel); Batavia dd.
6 November 1741. In De Jonge 1877,
ix: 372-393. (Referred to as "Letter 6 Nov.
1741")
Valentijn, Fran~ois. 1724-26. Oud en Nieuw Oost-
Indien. Dordrecht-Amsterdam. 5 Vols. in
8 Pts.
Vandenbosch, Amry. 1942. The Dutch East
Indies: Its Government, Problems and Politics.
Berkeley.
Verhandeling der Munten, Maaten en Gewichten
van Nederlandsch Indie. 1786. VBGKW 4.
Batavia.
Vermeulen, J. Th. 1938. De Chineezen te Batavia
en de Troebelen van 1740. Leiden.
Veth, P.]. 1896-1901. Java: Geographisch, Ethno-
logisch, Historisch. Haarlem. 4 Vols.
Vleming, J. L. 1926. Het Chineesch Zakenleven in
Nederlandsch-Indiii. Weltevreden.
Wright, H. R. C. 1961. East-Indian Economic
Problems of the Age of Cornwallis and RajJles.
London.
